We propose a lab experiment to understand if and how resource restrictions and uncertainty on the relative needs of future beneﬁciaries aﬀect physicians’ resource allocation decisions. When there are incentives to over-treat, we ﬁnd that a patient tended by a constrained physician under uncertainty obtains higher beneﬁts and receives allocations closer to her optimum than patients from physicians with no constraints or deciding under uncertainty alone. In addition, we observe a redistribution
of resources when physicians decide under resource restrictions and uncertainty. In particular, when resources are scarce, physicians tend to allocate the limited services to patients with higher beneﬁts in the absence of medical services, a higher capacity to beneﬁt from the resources, the scantiest need for service units, and the lowest beneﬁts at the optimum. Finally, we ﬁnd that constraints, whether with or without complete information on patient characteristics, lead selﬁsh physicians to approximate to what is best for the patient.